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This paper examines the mediating effect of democracy in
explaining the relationship between decentralization and
government size for the period 1970–2013. We proxy
decentralization by fiscal decentralization, use total spend-
ing as our primary measure of government size and adopt
the V-Dem high-level democracy indices as measures of
democracy. Our main finding is that the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and government spending
differs under different types of democracy. From the inter-
action term, the negative effect of fiscal decentralization
diminishes as the democracy level gets higher, particularly
for participatory democracy irrespective of whether govern-
ment size is measured by spending-to-GDP or employment.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Why have many countries decentralized? Several reasons may explain the increasingly common feature of decentral-
ization found in both developed and developing countries in recent decades (see Garman et al., 2001; Hooghe et al.,
2010). We note a few. First, decentralization may be welfare improving and enhance government accountability
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(Tiebout, 1956). Second, subnational governments are seen to be efficient and effective at resource allocation given
that they are closer to the citizenry and are likely to better determine and anticipate the needs and preferences of
their residents. Hence, subnational governments are expected to provide a good match between the preferences of
their residents and the available bundle of goods and services. In particular, fiscal decentralization assumes that sub-
national governments possess the needed autonomy both to raise revenues and to fund their expenditures with little
or no central government interference.
Governments can manage the effect of decentralization by changing the level of government size. However, the
effect of decentralization on government size depends on whether the government is a ‘benevolent agent’ or a
monolithic ‘Leviathan’. As a benevolent agent, government is assumed to act in the interest of the citizenry by read-
ily and accurately meeting the needs of citizens (Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 2009). Further, as noted ear-
lier, a decentralized system is characterized by improved efficiency and accountability, making it possible for the
citizenry to demand more public goods. Therefore, for a benevolent agent, decentralization is associated with a larger
government size. On the other hand, the Leviathan hypothesis assumes that greater decentralization leads to smaller
government size. Governments (both central and local governments) are assumed to be monolithic Leviathans, and
the major interest of public servants is to maximize revenues. Residents are assumed to possess information advan-
tages in addition to being mobile. A ‘race to the bottom’ may occur as subnational governments compete among
themselves to fix the lowest tax rates to attract and retain mobile financial capital. The effect of the latter will be
lower tax revenues; hence, the ‘beast’ is starved, and government size is reduced (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980).
Does democracy play any role in the relationship between decentralization and government size? First, it may
be easier for decentralization to be a political decision under a democracy as it involves reducing the concentration
of power with the central government. One of the most valued assets of nondemocracies or authoritarian govern-
ments is the concentration of power at the centre (Beyani, 2000), which is at variance with the motivations for
decentralization. Therefore, there is likely to be a minimal preference for decentralization in nondemocracies
(see Karlström, 2015; Qiao et al., 2019). Second, the assumptions of both the benevolent and Leviathan hypotheses
seem plausible under a democracy. For instance, the incentive of a government to be benevolent may be borne out
of a desire to meet the tastes, preferences and needs of voters in order to retain power in a democracy
(see Boix, 2001; Hicks & Swank, 1992; Isham et al., 1997). Furthermore, information advantages, demand for effi-
cient provision of public goods and services and ‘voting with the feet’ may require conditions such as free elections,
freedom of speech, fundamental human rights, public demand for accountability, effective institutions among others,
which are essential characteristics of a democracy (Karlström, 2015). Also, democracy in itself may be an effective
tool to ‘starve the beast’ under a Leviathan. Therefore, assuming the earlier arguments are valid, examining the medi-
ating role of democracy in the decentralization–government size relationship may provide an explanation for the
divergent and conflicting empirical evidence on the effect of decentralization on government size.1 There are impli-
cations of the relationship between fiscal decentralization, democracy and government size for development.
Democracy is expected to create an efficient government. Hence, by limiting the predatory nature of central govern-
ments, fostering accountability and efficiency, reducing the cost of providing public goods and services and encour-
aging innovation, decentralization is expected to lead to equitable levels of development at the subnational level. For
instance, Bossert et al. (2003) indicate that increased equity in resource allocation through decentralization is associ-
ated with improved health outcomes, health coverage and the administration of health systems in Colombia. Simi-
larly, Bardhan et al. (2008) indicates that decentralization is associated with a reduction in the biases in public service
delivery in West Bengal, India. Conversely, decentralization may lead to soft budget constraints, macroeconomic
instability, clientelism and partisanship which may hinder development.
Crucially, any attempt to consider the role of democracy in explaining the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and government size must note the importance of the different conceptions of representative
1Note that variations in the extent of both decentralization and democracy can affect the decentralization–government size relationship. Such variations
may be in the form of transitions within or between political regime types which create changes in political constraints (e.g., fiscal rules and independent
central banks) and in the behaviour of public servants (Marlow, 1988).
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democracy. In that case, measures of democracy in its broad sense (such as a simple binary 0,1 indicator of democracy
and autocracy), a simple measure of a country's political regime, or using institutional quality to gauge the level of
democracy may not be enough as the relationship may be more nuanced than direct. Various conceptions of democracy
may have varying implications given the differences in the characteristic principles of democracy they measure:
electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and/or egalitarian democracies. While the electoral principle of democracy is
an essential component of any other conception of representative democracy, such conceptions retain their unique
characteristics in principle which likely have implications for the relationship being considered here. For instance, one
bedrock of the electoral principle of democracy is the delegation of authority to representatives which is not exactly the
same as a preference for, where practicable, a direct involvement of the citizens in decision making under a participatory
democracy. Added to this, a more liberal democracy may provide limits on central government power, allowing
devolution of power to local governments. The egalitarian principle of democracy expects that resources are distributed
equally among all social groups. These and other characteristics are essential not only for decentralization but also to
demonstrate voter preferences for public goods and its consequent effect on government size.
This paper provides an extension to existing findings on the role of democracy in mediating the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and government size. The paper looks beyond just the broad concept of democracy
and uses varieties of democracy indices for 76 developed and developing countries for the years 1970–2013. The
sample mirrors that of Qiao et al. (2019) and extends the study with the new indicators of democracy. We adopt the
V-Dem high-level democracy indices (see Coppedge et al., 2020) in measuring democracy: electoral, liberal, participa-
tory, deliberative and egalitarian democracy indices. We introduce an interaction term of fiscal decentralization and
the varieties of democracy indices to capture the mediating effect of democracy. This is a unique approach compared
to a similar study on the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship between decentralization and government
size discussed later in the literature review. Our primary measure of government size is real per capita total (central
plus local) government expenditure to GDP from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). We proxy
decentralization by fiscal decentralization–expenditure decentralization measured as the ratio of state and local gov-
ernment spending to general government spending from the World Bank's Decentralization indicator database. We
make use of the fixed effects estimation technique with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors to account for cross-sectional
and time dependence. Our robustness analysis includes an estimation with a subsample of developed and developing
countries, an estimation with the log of public sector employment as an alternative measure of government size, an
estimation in first differences with regime change lag as an alternative measure of democracy and an instrumental
variable estimation to address endogeneity concerns.2
Finally, in another unique contribution, we examine non-linearity to determine if the extent (intensity) of decen-
tralization matters for the effect of decentralization on government size. Conceptually, if intensity matters, then both
the direct and indirect effects of decentralization on government size may differ at both higher and lower levels of
either decentralization or democracy. For instance, if indeed decentralization starves the beast, then at the peak
of decentralization, government size should be smaller. However, given that government welfare spending increases
as a country becomes more democratic, there is likely to be a higher demand for bigger government size in advanced
democracies. These two scenarios although contradictory suggest that if the rate of change in the degree of decen-
tralization differs from the rate of change in the size of government, then the relationship between decentralization
and government size may be non-linear or nonmonotonic and may have peaks or troughs.
To summarize our results, our baseline results clearly establishes effects of fiscal decentralization and democracy
on government size: negative for both variables and for all measures of democracy, and this is confirmed by our main
results. Our main finding is that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government spending differs
under varieties of democracy. For democracy, we find that an increase in participatory democracy more strongly
affects government size than increases in other types of democracy. Hence, the most important features of democ-
racy relevant to the democracy–government size relationship are those that are captured within the participatory
2The data set is freely available for other researchers to use and is available on request from the author.
KWABENA OBENG 3
democracy index. The interaction term shows that the negative effect of fiscal decentralization diminishes as the
democracy index gets higher, particularly for the participatory democracy index irrespective of whether government
size is measured by spending-to-GDP or employment. The results for the interaction term are consistent in all cases
except for developing countries where we find a negative interaction term for the liberal democracy index and no
statistically significant effect of the interaction term for all other concepts of democracy. We do not find a non-linear
relationship between decentralization and government size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief literature review. We dis-
cuss methodology and estimation results in Sections 3 and 4, before turning to conclusions and policy recommenda-
tions in Section 5.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Empirical evidence on the relationship between government size and fiscal decentralization is mixed, although the
balance seems to tilt in favor of the Leviathan hypothesis (Golem, 2010; Stegarescu, 2005). Early research on
the subject matter do not find statistically significant results (see Forbes & Zampelli, 1989; Nelson, 1986;
Oates, 1985) although these studies are deficient in their definition and measurement of the relevant concepts (see
Marlow, 1988). As expected, there are empirical studies with evidence for the benevolent agent hypothesis
(Cassette & Paty, 2010; Jia et al., 2014; Martinez-Vazquez & Yao, 2009; Wu & Lin, 2012) and the Leviathan hypothe-
sis (see Feld et al., 2010; Grossman, 1989; Liberati & Sacchi, 2013; Marlow, 1988).3
Curiously, only a few papers control for democracy in examining the effect of decentralization on government
size. While Boix (2001), Feld et al. (2010), Jin and Zou (2002) and Liberati and Sacchi (2013) include measures of
democracy or political/institutional variables as controls in examining the relationship under consideration, they do
not examine the mediating effect of democracy. For instance, in examining the effect of fiscal decentralization on
aggregated, national and subnational government sizes, Jin and Zou (2002) uses four variables to measure the
political/institutional factors. The first, a dummy variable measuring ‘political central bank’(lack of central bank
independence) equals 1 if there is a change in the governor of the central bank within 6 months of a change in
government and 0 otherwise. The second, a dummy variable measuring unitary state versus federal state equals 1 if
a federal state and 0 otherwise. The third, a dummy variable for elected versus non-elected subnational governments
equals 1 if the elected and 0 otherwise. Finally, a dummy variable equals 1 if there are borrowing restrictions on
subnational governments and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Liberati and Sacchi (2013) controls for (i) federal countries using
a dummy variable equals 1 if a federal country and 0 otherwise and (ii) left-wing political parties using a dummy
variable equals 1 for ruling left-wing political parties and 0 otherwise.
Two papers are closely related to our study. Baskaran (2011) examines the mediating role of ideology in the
effect of fiscal decentralization on government size for 18 OECD for the period 1980–2000. Two measures of ideol-
ogy are used. First, an index for OECD countries equals 1 if the government is a far-right and 5 if it is considered to
be a far-left.4 Second, the gov1rlc variable measures the ideology of the largest government party on a three-digit
scale, right-wing parties equal 1, centrist parties equal 2 and left-wing parties equal 3, with parties that cannot be
classified using the left-right scale coded as 0.5 The CPDS I ideology measure provides a detailed data for countries
with relatively similar institutional structure although it covers a small sample size. The gov1rlc variable is also weak
as it is less precise (adopts a three-digit scale) and possibly narrower (captures the ideology of the largest govern-
ment party only). The paper interacts ideology with two measures of decentralization, expenditure and revenue
3Other studies with evidence for the Leviathan hypothesis include Joulfaian and Marlow ((1990), (1991)), Ehdaie (1994), Grossman and West (1994),
Shadbegian (1999), Jin and Zou (2002), Rodden (2003) and Fiva (2006).
4Source: CPDS I database, Armingeon et al. (2008).
5Source: Database of Political Institutions, Beck et al. (2001).
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decentralization. The paper finds a positive effect of decentralization on government size irrespective of the ideology
of the central government, with the effect larger for left-versus right governments.
To a large extent, the current paper is an extension of Qiao et al. (2019) to consider varieties of democracy and
nonmonotonicity. Qiao et al. (2019) provide empirical evidence for the mediating role of democracy in the
decentralization–government size relationship for 76 developed and developing countries over the period
1972–2013. The paper uses two measures of democracy. First, an average of political right and civil liberties index
from Freedom House rescaled to take values between 0 and 10, where higher values imply more democratic
governments and lower values otherwise. Second, an index for political democracy equals 1 and 0 otherwise and for
political autocracy equals 1 and 0 otherwise from the PolityIV data set. The paper finds a positive effect of the
interaction term, implying that at higher levels of democracy, fiscal decentralization is associated with bigger
government size. The results are robust across alternative measures of government size, decentralization and
democracy; alternative data frames; alternative specifications and accounting for endogeneity issues. However, the
measures of democracy used do not capture the nuances of the concept of democracy described earlier.
2.1 | V-Dem as a measure of democracy
Beyond the classical description of democracy as rule by the people, there are great debates on both the descriptive and
normative aspects of the concept of democracy. For instance, there is no consensus on what political regimes are and
what they ought to be, making it impossible to obtain a single measure of democracy that is universally accepted
(Coppedge et al., 2017). Admittedly, the most popular measures of democracy are the Freedom House and Polity
indices. Some indices of democracy such as the binary democracy–dictatorship (DD) index of democracy provide a
narrow definition of democracy, considering the electoral properties of democracy only. The Polity2 index for instance
has been criticized as masking the realities of its component—the United States—is described as a fully democratic
polity in almost all periods of the index although the extent to which women, most blacks, and many poor formed part
of the electorate differs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.6 Further, for some indices, specific components or
attributes included in their computation do not directly relate to democracy (e.g., the level of civilian control of the
police as an attribute of the Civil Liberties index of FreedomHouse). In addition, other indices of democracy ignore the
multidimensional nature of the concept of democracy, focus on the competitive or liberal aspects of democracy and
ignore other properties such as deliberative or egalitarian democracy (e.g., the Economic Intelligence Unit [EIU] index
of democracy). Another critique of knownmeasures of democracy is that while they may help create a clear distinction
between ‘better or worse’ democracies, they may be inadequate in substantively determining the actual conditions of
democracy that exist. There are other weaknesses with known democracy indices attributable to their sources, the
level of disaggregation, coverage, discrimination, aggregation and their validity and reliability.7
Why the V-Dem indicator? The V-Dem data provides a new approach to the conceptualization and measure-
ment of democracy. The V-Dem data are orthogonal to other popular measures of democracy such as the Polity and
Freedom House indices, providing a wide-ranging database made up of different conceptions of democracy, a large
array of mesolevel indices of various components of the concepts of democracy, in addition to about 350 specific
indicators. The V-Dem index has a longer historical span (from 1789 for 173 countries). To ensure validity and reli-
ability, multiple, independent coders are used for each (nonfactual) question. The index construction process involves
the incorporation of intercoder reliability tests within a Bayesian measurement model. There are confidence intervals
constructed for all point estimates associated with nonfactual questions. Finally, the aggregation procedures are
6See Keyssar (2000), Paxton (2000) and Coppedge et al. (2017).
7Specifically, (i) some are not comprehensive, comparable or regular and may be subjective and inconsistent; (ii) some are not highly and systematically
disaggregated which makes them fairly abstract in their approach; (iii) some are limited in country and time coverage; (iv) some are unable to precisely and
reliably distinguish between greater and lesser degrees/levels of democracy; (v) some are unclear or inconsistent approaches to aggregation and (vi) the
choices in definition, sources of data and aggregation create potential validity and reliability problems (see Coppedge et al., 2017 for a detailed discussion).
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transparent, and data are freely available for all indicators and original coder-level judgments. Essentially, V-Dem
considers seven properties of democracy with distinct set of core values: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual,
participatory, deliberative and egalitarian.8 The core values of these principles/properties of democracy are
(i) electoral: contestation and competition; (ii) liberal: individual liberty, protection against tyranny of majority and
state repression; (iii) majoritarian: majority rule, governing capacity and accountability; (iv) consensual: voice and
representation of all groups, possibly sharing power; (v) participatory: direct, active participation in decision
making by the people; (vi) deliberative: reasoned debate and national arguments and (vii) egalitarian: equal political
empowerment. It is worth stating that V-Dem considers the electoral principle as fundamental to and important for
all other principles of democracy under its conceptual scheme. Hence, a regime without elections is not considered
democratic, bearing in mind that incomplete polyarchies may possess some form of democratic qualities. The
electoral dimension of democracy is considered as a continuum. Therefore, V-Dem provides a broader range of ideals
of democracy, taking into consideration the possible contradictions in the core values that make up the properties of
democracy described earlier. Most importantly, ‘having separate indices that represent these different facets of
democracy will make it possible for policymakers and academics to examine potential trade-offs empirically’
(Coppedge et al., 2017, p. 24). The current study adopts five concepts of democracy from the high-level indices
(HLIs) of the V-Dem measures as data for the majoritarian and consensual principles of democracy were not available
at the time of the study. Notwithstanding, the remaining five concepts significantly cover varieties of democracy,
hence offering a fairly comprehensive description of the concept of democracy. In terms of recent empirical applica-
tions, the V-Dem index has been adopted to examine extrajudicial violence and autocratic rule, to measure citizen
ownership of the state, to examine the impact of democracy on social and economic development and to examine
political regimes and refugee entries. In addition, the V-Dem indices have been used to examine courts and the
constitutional erosion of democracy in Latin America, citizen demonstrations in Russia, political networks across the
globe, autocracies and human development, electoral systems and income inequality, the political effects of decoloni-
zation, electoral democracy and corruption, authoritarian notions of democracy and autocratic legislatures and party
institutionalization.9
3 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
3.1 | Model specification
We examine the fiscal decentralization–government size relationship considering the mediating role of democracy as
follows:
Govsizeit ¼ αþσFDitþυDEMitþρðFD∗DEMÞitþ τXitþμiþηtþϵit, ð1Þ
where Govsize refers to government size: our primary measure of government size is total government expenditure
as a percentage of GDP, used in natural logarithm form. Later, we introduce the log of total public sector employ-
ment as an alternative measure of government size. Country and year are represented as i and t, respectively. The
fiscal decentralization indicator is given as FD and is measured in natural logarithm, DEM refers to the democracy
measure and FD ∗DEM represents the interaction term between decentralization and democracy. The coefficients of
interest are σ, υ and ρ. In their respective cases, we expect negative effects of fiscal decentralization and democracy
on government size but a positive effect of the interaction term on government size a priori, following previous liter-
ature. The latter suggests that as the level of democracy increases, fiscal decentralization will be associated with an
increase in government size. X represents control variables: real GDP per capita, urbanization, the share of young
8These are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3.
9The V-Dem Institute Users' Working Papers series provides a comprehensive list of papers submitted by users of the V-Dem data. The working papers
can be found here.
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population and the share of old population given in natural logarithms; others are the KOF globalization index, cen-
tral bank independence, monetary union and fiscal rules. Year dummy, country dummy and the error term are given
as μi, ηt and ϵit, respectively. Cross-sectional dependence is possible in any panel data as panel groups (countries in
our case) are independent, heterogeneous and susceptible to shocks from each other. For instance, countries in an
economic block or grouping such as the European Union may benefit from the spill-over effects of democracy as it
permeates through the block. Also, fiscal decentralization may be similarly adopted by neighbouring countries or
countries with common interests. Therefore, shocks associated with both fiscal decentralization and democracy in a
given country may be experienced in other closely linked countries.10 We adopt the two-way fixed effects estimator
with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors to account for general forms of temporal and cross-sectional dependence since
panel data sets are prone to incidents of cross-sectional dependence (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). This makes the fixed
effects estimation results more robust.
3.2 | Data
Summary statistics of all variables are provided in Table A1. We show the correlation between the varieties of
democracy variables in Table A2. Clearly, the varieties of democracy variables are highly correlated which lends sup-
port to individual estimations with each of them as proxy for democracy in their respective cases.
3.2.1 | Dependent variable
The primary measure of government size is total expenditure measured as the share of total government expenditure
to GDP, which is sourced from the World Bank WDI database. The spending measure used here is comprehensive as
it captures all local and central government spending, making it an appropriate measure of government size in this
case. Similarly used by Rodden (2004), Prohl and Schneider (2009) and Kotera et al. (2012). As an alternative mea-
sure, we use the log of total public sector employment from the International Labour Organization (ILO) as proxy for
government size (see Martinez-Vazquez & Yao, 2009; Qiao et al., 2019)
3.2.2 | Fiscal decentralization
Fiscal decentralization is proxied by expenditure decentralization measured as the ratio of subnational (state and
local) government spending to general government spending. It is the measure commonly used in the literature as it
adequately accounts for total government intrusion (see Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Golem, 2010; Marlow, 1988;
Oates, 1985). Data on expenditure decentralization are from the World Bank's Decentralization Indicator database.
3.2.3 | Democracy
As noted earlier, similar studies fail to capture the various conceptions of democracy. Hence, we adopt an approach
which encompasses the varieties of democracy. We account for electoral democracy, liberal democracy, participatory
democracy, deliberative democracy and egalitarian democracy. Data on our democracy indices are sourced from the
V-Dem data set (see Coppedge et al., 2020; Pemstein et al., 2020). A full description of the properties of the V-Dem
is shown in Table A6.
10An example in recent years is the Arab spring of the 2010s.
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3.2.4 | Electoral democracy index
The electoral principle of democracy captures the principle that democracy creates an enabling atmosphere for rulers
to be responsive to citizens, which can be achieved through competition for citizenry vote of approval in an election,
a process that must allow an extensive level of usual suffrage. The electoral democracy index is constructed with an
interval of low to high, represented as 0–1, respectively.11
3.2.5 | Liberal democracy index
The concept of liberal democracy considers the extent to which democracy successfully limits the power of govern-
ments, providing room for the protection of individual and minority rights against the ‘tyranny’ of the majority. At
the core of the liberal principle of democracy are constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an inde-
pendent judiciary and effective checks and balances which must succeed in limiting the excessive use of executive
power. The index is calculated taking the level of electoral democracy into consideration. It is an index with an inter-
val 0–1 representing low to high, respectively.
3.2.6 | Participatory democracy index
The participatory principle of democracy has at its core value, an active citizenry participation in all political pro-
cesses which may be electoral or non-electoral. Here, delegating authority to elected representatives may not be
enough as it is expected that where possible, other platforms are created for citizenry direct involvement. This could
be ensured through engagement with civil society organizations, direct democracy and elected bodies at the sub-
national level. The index is on an interval of 0–1 representing low to high participatory democracy, respectively, and
takes electoral democracy into account.
3.2.7 | Deliberative democracy index
The deliberative democracy index is an index of the process of decision making in a polity. The expectation is that
political decision making is driven by public reasoning aimed at ensuring common good as against emotional appeals,
solidary attachments, parochial interests or coercion. Hence, democracy must involve respectful dialogue at all levels
of the decision-making process, from conceptualization to implementation rather than a summation of known prefer-
ences. The deliberative democracy index is given on an interval of 0–1 representing low to high, respectively, and
considers the level of electoral democracy.
3.2.8 | Egalitarian democracy index
Finally, the egalitarian democracy index measures the extent to which the ideal of egalitarian democracy is achieved.
The egalitarian principle of democracy considers the potential of material and immaterial inequalities to limit the
enjoyment of formal rights and liberties, placing limits on the ability of citizens from diverse social groups to
11It takes the average of, or the weighted average of, indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials and
suffrage and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices (see Coppedge et al., 2020). All other indices are aggregated
taking electoral democracy index into consideration and by replacing the specific index in the following formula: υ2xlibdem¼ :25 ∗ υ2xpolyarchy1:585 þ
:25 ∗ υ2xliberalþ :5 ∗ υ2xpolyarchy1:585 ∗ υ2xliberal.
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participate in the democratic process. To ensure egalitarian democracy, the rights and freedoms of all individuals
must be protected regardless of their social group, there must be equal distribution of resources across all such
groups, as well as equal access to power for all individuals and groups. It is given on an interval of low to high (0–1)
and considers electoral democracy.
3.2.9 | Control variables
The control variables are real GDP per capita (GDPpc), urbanization (Urban), the share of young population (Young),
the share of old population (Old) given in natural logarithms, the KOF index of globalization (KOFGI), an index for
central bank independence (CBI), a dummy for monetary union (EMU) and a dummy for fiscal rules (Fiscal rule).
According to Wagner's law (Wagner, 1893), government spending as share of GDP increases with increases in
national income; hence, we use real GDP per capita as proxy for national income. Urbanization is introduced to cap-
ture government consumption and investment (Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998) and is measured as urban population as
share of total population. The share of the young and old population in the total population of any country repre-
sents the size of its dependant nonworking population. The size of the dependant population matters; young popula-
tion demands higher spending on education while old population demands higher spending on health care. Hence,
countries with larger share of the dependant population are likely to have bigger government size. The current paper
captures the share of young population as the population in the ages 0–14 as share of total population and old
population as the population 65+ as share of total population. Where there is central bank independence (CBI), there
is limited central bank financing of government budgets either directly or indirectly, and government size is likely to
be smaller (Fischer, 1995). The dummy variable for a monetary union is equal to 1 if a country participated in an
Economic and Monetary Union in years t and afterwards or 0 otherwise. The strict requirements of a monetary
union implies that members are less likely to have huge deficits, and this helps restrain government expansion
(Qiao et al., 2019). Fiscal rules are likely to improve fiscal outcomes especially when it succeeds in coordinating an
effective fiscal decentralization (Alesina & Bayoumi, 1996; Neyapti, 2013). Fiscal rules is therefore given as a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a country has at least one fiscal rule (e.g., expenditure rule, revenue rule, budget balance rule or
debt rule) in place and 0 otherwise. Globalization may lead to governments increasing spending to compensate for
trade-related risks or to offset volatility and insecurity (compensation hypothesis, Rodrik, 1998) or governments
reducing spending due for example to a reduction in tax revenues which may be caused by a ‘race to the bottom’
resulting from global competition to attract and retain capital (‘efficiency hypothesis’ Garrett, 1998). We proxy
globalization by the KOF overall globalization index.
Data on real GDP per capita, urbanization, the share of young population and the share of old population are
obtained from the World Bank (2018). Data for monetary union and central bank independence are sourced from the
European Union and Garriga (2016), respectively. The fiscal rules dummy is sourced from the IMF Fiscal Rules Data-
base (see Lledo et al., 2017). Finally, data for the KOF overall globalization index are sourced from Gygli et al. (2019).
4 | ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.1 | Exploratory analysis
We provide a graphical description of the V-Dem measures of democracy in Figures 1 and A1. Figures 1 and A1
show a description of trends in each of the measures of V-Dem adopted. In Figure 1, we plot trends by splitting the
sample of countries into developed and developing countries, to compare trends between the two country groupings
considered here. Overall, the graphs in Figure 1 show generally upward trending levels of all V-Dem measures. In
addition, the levels of electoral and liberal democracies have been generally higher for developed countries for all
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years relative to developing countries. For deliberative and egalitarian democracies, however, developing countries
seem to have higher levels compared to developed countries in the early years of the 1970s, although the trend
switched in favour of developed countries since the late 1970s. Interestingly, up until the mid-1990s, the trend
shows higher levels of participatory democracy in developing countries relative to developed countries. Besides, the
gap in the trend in participatory democracy between developed and developing countries is closer post mid-1990s,
and it is the closest among all other V-Dem measures of democracy. Figure A1 shows how countries score on each
of the V-Dem measures of democracy, for both developed and developing countries for the end year 2013.
4.2 | Baseline results
The baseline results sets out to determine the individual effects of both fiscal decentralization and democracy on
government size (as measured by government spending). Hence, the results are without the interaction term. The
results are given in Table 1.
From Table 1, fiscal decentralization has a negative and statistically significant effect on government size when
we control for all forms of democracy. Thus, increased fiscal decentralization is associated with reduced government
size irrespective of the variety of democracy controlled for. In terms of magnitude, a 1% increase in fiscal decentrali-
zation is associated with between 4.8% and 5.0% reduction in government size. The amounts are clearly not trivial,
although they might easily be swayed by other influences on government size, especially in developed countries.
F IGURE 1 Comparative trends in V-Dem democracy measures between developed and developing countries,
1970–2013. Source: V-Dem. The sample of countries in each graph are the same for the regression [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
10 KWABENA OBENG
We therefore find preliminary evidence for the Leviathan hypothesis similar to Grossman (1989), Joulfaian and
Marlow (1990, 1991), Ehdaie (1994), Grossman and West (1994) and Shadbegian (1999).
The results also show negative and statistically significant effects of the electoral and participatory democracy
indices on government size. A unit increase in the democracy indices is associated with between 10% and 21%
decrease in government size as measured by government spending-to-GDP.
For the control variables, we find no evidence of Wagner's law, rather real GDP per capita has a
negative and statistically significant effect on government size when we control for electoral and participatory
democracies. An increased share of old population is associated with reduced government size in all cases; the share
of old population has a negative and statistically significant effect on government size. The KOF overall globalization
index and the share of young population however have a positive and statistically significant effect on
government size.
Hence, the baseline results provide a hint of the possible effects of both fiscal decentralization and democracy
on government size, generally negative for the former and negative for the latter for electoral and participatory
democracies.
TABLE 1 Baseline results: fiscal decentralization and government size
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.048***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
DEM 0.100* -0.077 0.205** 0.039 0.006
(0.053) (0.055) (0.090) (0.060) (0.063)
GDPpc 0.163* 0.156* 0.171* 0.151 0.142
(0.091) (0.090) (0.095) (0.092) (0.089)
KOFGI 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Urban 0.044 0.047 0.025 0.051 0.058
(0.126) (0.127) (0.124) (0.127) (0.128)
Young 0.357** 0.371*** 0.339** 0.376*** 0.388***
(0.135) (0.134) (0.134) (0.137) (0.131)
Old 0.467*** 0.446*** 0.481*** 0.432*** 0.412***
(0.148) (0.145) (0.153) (0.145) (0.135)
CBI 0.051 0.051 0.054 0.050 0.046
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
EMU 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.002
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Fiscalrule 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.013
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1176 1176 1176 1176 1176
Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Note: Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
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4.3 | Main results
For our main results, we re-estimated each of the regressions in Table 1, including interaction terms for each mea-
sure of democracy with fiscal decentralization to determine the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship
between decentralization and government size. The results are given in Table 2.
Similar to the baseline results, we find a negative and statistically significant effect of fiscal decentralization on
government size, irrespective of the variety of democracy. The negative effect of fiscal decentralization suggests that
fiscal decentralization on its own may be an effective tool to ‘starve the beast’.12 The electoral, liberal and
12In the sense of reducing the amount of resources available to the central government to finance its spending; some taxes may be localized and there may
be central government grants to local governments. The term as used here may not strictly define—‘starving the beast’—the concept or political strategy of
deliberating cutting taxes to reduce central government revenues and limit its ability to spend. See for instance Buchanan (1976), Buchanan and Wagner
(1977), Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1979), Niskanen (2006) and Romer and Romer (2007).
TABLE 2 Main results: the mediating effect of varieties of democracy
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD 0.113*** 0.0873*** 0.103*** 0.098*** 0.101***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032)
DEM 0.236** 0.215* 0.410** 0.204 0.171
(0.100) (0.120) (0.160) (0.125) (0.127)
FD ∗DEM 0.007** 0.006* 0.009** 0.007** 0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
GDPpc 0.138 0.131 0.149* 0.123 0.124
(0.083) (0.082) (0.087) (0.083) (0.082)
KOFGI 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Urban 0.029 0.002 0.050 0.0001 0.012
(0.133) (0.130) (0.128) (0.130) (0.129)
Young 0.444*** 0.440*** 0.419*** 0.461*** 0.445***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.114)
Old 0.448*** 0.436*** 0.480*** 0.428*** 0.406***
(0.141) (0.139) (0.151) (0.138) (0.132)
CBI 0.040 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.038
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
EMU 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.004
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037)
Fiscalrule 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.006
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1176 1176 1176 1176 1176
Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Note: Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
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participatory democracy indices have negative and statistically significant effect on government size, but the effects
of deliberative and egalitarian democracy indices are not statistically significant. In terms of the magnitude of the
effect, a unit increase in the participatory democracy index is associated with 41% decrease in government size as
measured by government spending-GDP. What do the results mean? That, an increase in participatory democracy
more strongly affects government size than increases in other types of democracy. Hence, the most important fea-
tures of democracy relevant to the democracy–government size relation are those that are captured within the par-
ticipatory democracy index.
We now turn to the results for the interaction term designed to test for the mediating effect of democracy. The
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant in all cases. The interaction term therefore
shows that the negative effect of fiscal decentralization is diminishing as the democracy level gets higher. Signifi-
cantly, the coefficient of the interaction term is largest in the results for the participatory democracy index. This is
quite significant as the target of every decentralization effort is to among others increase the direct participation of
citizens and civil society in the democratic decision-making process. The results suggests that such increased partici-
pation may be associated with increasing government size. The results here mirrors closely those in Qiao
et al. (2019), albeit with a different measure of democracy.
4.4 | Additional results
This section contains the summary results for our subsample of developed versus developing countries, the
results for our alternative measure of government size and the results for our alternative measure of democracy
(regime change). We represent the summary results for the subsample of countries in Table 3, the full results for our
alternative measure of government size in Table 4 and the full results for our alternative measure of democracy in
Table 5.
4.4.1 | Subsample: Developed versus developing countries
The rational behind using a subsample of countries follows the argument that developing countries are more likely to
be associated with lower levels of democracy. Moreover, developing countries are associated with relatively lower
levels of development which is likely to affect the democratic efforts of such countries. Since fiscal decentralization
thrives best in high levels of democracy, the levels of fiscal decentralization, if any, may be relatively lower in
TABLE 3 Subsample: developed versus developing countries
Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
Panel A: Developed
FD     
DEM     
FD ∗DEM + + + + +
Panel B: Developing
FD No No No No No
DEM No No  No No
FD ∗DEM No  No No No
Note: Summary of results for the subsample of developed and developing countries. Here, +,  and No refer to positive
effect, negative effect and no statistically significant effect, respectively.
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developing countries. Further, developing countries have relatively lower levels of resources available to fund gov-
ernment spending compared to developed countries. Hence, it may not be enough to simply control for GDP per
capita; a more nuanced approach that involves explicitly dividing samples into developed and developing countries
may be appropriate. From a development perspective, understanding the relation between fiscal decentralization,
democracy and government size may be important to developing an appropriate policy design for a bottom-up
approach to local government development.
Turning to our results for the subsample of countries, Panel A represents results for developed countries, and
Panel B the results for developing countries.
The results for the developed countries are qualitatively similar to those for the main results: negative and statis-
tically significant effects of fiscal decentralization and the varieties of democracy on government size and a positive
effect of the interaction term on government size. The effect size of fiscal decentralization is largest for deliberative
democracy while the effect size of democracy is largest for participatory democracy. Here, also, the interaction term
TABLE 4 Employment as an alternative measure of government size
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.011 0.009
(0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016)
DEM 0.295** 0.308** 0.543*** 0.189* 0.342*
(0.108) (0.110) (0.133) (0.100) (0.183)
FD ∗DEM 0.0004 0.001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
GDPpc 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.026 0.013
(0.126) (0.125) (0.128) (0.135) (0.127)
KOFGI 0.0006 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.0004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban 1.044*** 1.067*** 1.030*** 1.136*** 1.104***
(0.160) (0.155) (0.154) (0.155) (0.151)
Young 0.312 0.322 0.297 0.212 0.275
(0.470) (0.464) (0.491) (0.510) (0.464)
Old 0.105 0.086 0.085 0.100 0.0619
(0.207) (0.196) (0.200) (0.208) (0.188)
CBI 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.004
(0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
EMU 0.028** 0.027** 0.031** 0.027** 0.029**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Fiscalrule 0.030* 0.028 0.026 0.032* 0.032*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 546 545 545 546 546
Countries 49 48 48 49 49
Note: Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
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shows that for developed countries, the negative effect of fiscal decentralization is diminishing as the democracy
level gets higher for all varieties of democracy. The results for the interaction term may not be surprising as devel-
oped countries have relatively higher levels of fiscal decentralization. The positive coefficient of the interaction term
suggests that if the process of decision making in a developed country is driven by a desire to meet the common
good as against a mere attempt to aggregate observable preferences, then fiscal decentralization could be associated
with even bigger government size, suggesting a willingness of governments to provide more public goods—perhaps,
benevolent governments.
However, for developing countries, there is a negative and statistically significant effect of the participatory
democracy index on government size and a negative and statistically significant effect of the interaction term on
government size for the liberal democracy index. The negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that the
negative effect of decentralization is increasing as the liberal democracy index gets higher. Therefore, in the presence
of constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary and effective checks and
TABLE 5 Regime change as an



























Note: Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
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balances, fiscal decentralization could be an effective tool to reduce government size in developing countries. This is
significant as developing countries are noted to struggle with unnecessarily large government sizes.
In sum, the result here seems to suggest that the main results are being driven by developed countries. This may
not be surprising as developed countries have relatively higher levels of both fiscal decentralization and democracy
compared to developing countries. The full results are presented in Tables A4 and A5.
4.4.2 | Employment: An alternative measure of government size
As noted earlier, we follow Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) and Qiao et al. (2019) and use the log of total public
sector employment (simply referred to as employment) as an alternative measure of government size. The pairwise
correlation between employment is however low (0.05) which may suggest that the former may not be an appropri-
ate proxy for the latter. However, we argue that we use employment not necessarily as an alternative measure of
spending but as an alternative measure of government size. Employment provides a measure of government size in
terms of numbers, the number of people in public sector employment. Further, it may be suggestive of the extent of
government spending on public sector wages and salaries (a part of total spending), which may explain the low corre-
lation coefficient. Hence, in principle, it is an appropriate measure of government size and perhaps suggestive of the
cost to government spending in terms of wages and salaries paid to public sector employees.
Significantly, the results here provide somemore support to the main findings. Specifically, the democracy index is
more strongly negatively related to government size in all cases and for the participatory democracy index in particular.
That is, an increase in theparticipatory democracy indexmore strongly affects government size, asmeasuredby employ-
ment, than increases in other democracy indices. The findings heremay be explained as follows: electoral, liberal, partici-
patory, deliberative and egalitarian democracies provide opportunities for private sector involvement in the economy,
increasing private sector employment and perhaps reducing public sector employment, hence, government size. The
weakness here however is that the fiscal decentralization and interaction terms are no longer statistically significant.
4.4.3 | Regime change: An alternative measure of democracy
As an alternative, we adopt a regime change measure of democracy to capture changes in regime. This is important
as transitions within or between political regime types may create changes in political constraints (such as fiscal rules
and central government independence) and in the behaviour of bureaucrats and public servants (Marlow, 1988).
Such changes may have implications for both decentralization and government size and, hence, the relationship
between them. Marlow (1988) argues that where political constraints remain invariant over time, government poli-
cies and the behaviour of bureaucrats and public servants do not also change; policy decisions of governments and
bureaucrats or public servants are in part restricted by political constraints. Therefore, changes in the behaviour of
public servants and governments are likely to be linked to the changes in the political constraints they face or even
changes in the political regime.
We account for regime change by introducing a measure of regime change (regime change lag) and
estimating Equation (1) in first differences.13 The advantage of using the regime change lag indicator is that it
proceeds from a less restrictive definition of institutional democracy as a concept, maximizing observations on
regime transition phases (Bjørnskov & Rode, 2020). A first difference estimation therefore rightly captures the switch
13The regime change variable in Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) differs from that of Cheibub et al. (2010) by applying a different timing rule; it ‘count all regime
changes before July 1 of year x as pertaining to year x, and all regime transitions after that date as pertaining to year x+ 1’ (Bjørnskov & Rode, 2020, p. 4).
Hence, relative to the original data in Cheibub et al. (2010), the regime change data in Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) are lagged by half a year. What we adopt
here—Regime change lag—is a regime change indicator of whether a regime transition occurred in the second half of the year, easily restoring the original
timing rule in Cheibub et al. (2010).
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from 0 to 1 between any regimes and its direct effect on government size, in addition to its indirect effect on
government size through fiscal decentralization.
Turning to the results in Table 5, changes in fiscal decentralization is associated with a reduction in government
spending. The coefficient of the fiscal decentralization variable is negative and statistically significant. There is how-
ever no direct effect of changes in regime on government spending. Also, changes in fiscal decentralization between
any regime change have no statistically significant effect on government size; the coefficient of the interaction term
is statistically insignificant.
4.4.4 | Endogeneity concern
It is possible to contemplate issues of endogeneity from Equation (1), and this may be due to reverse causal relation-
ship between decentralization and spending, omitted variable bias and/or measurement error. Such endogeneity
concerns have been raised in the literature (see Jin et al., 2005; Qiao et al., 2008; Zhang & Zou, 1998) although they
do not explicitly control for it. We follow Qiao et al. (2019) and adopt an instrument which is given as the ‘weighted
average of fiscal decentralization from the neighbouring countries(weighted by the contiguity matrix)’ as instrument
for fiscal decentralization in an instrumental variable estimation framework. There are likely to be similarities
between neighbouring countries in the design and im plementation of fiscal decentralization policies, although the
size of their individual government is not expected to influence the fiscal decentralization policy of its neighbor
(see Qiao et al., 2019). The test statistics for the validity of the instruments used and the reliability of the results do
not reject that our instrument is valid and reliable. Our estimations pass the tests of underidentification and weak
identification in all cases. The F statistic from the first-stage regression is slightly below the rule-of-thumb threshold
of 10 in all cases, but there seems no glaring problem of weak instruments (Staiger & Stock, 1997).
Turning to the estimation results in Table 6, the interesting finding here is that participatory democracy is over-
taken by egalitarian democracy as the type of democracy with the strongest results. Further, the effect of fiscal
decentralization is strongest for the results with the egalitarian democracy index. Moreover, the interaction term is
positive and statistically significant for egalitarian democracy, suggesting that the negative effect of fiscal decentrali-
zation diminishes as the levels of the egalitarian democracy index gets higher. The results here somewhat call into
question the earlier findings.
4.5 | Nonmonotonic relationship
The argument for the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between decentralization and government spending
may be explained as follows. A linear relationship implies the variables involved increase (decrease) in the same direc-
tion and at the same rate. In addition, a monotonic relationship suggests that decentralization and government size
increase (decrease) in the same direction, although not always at the same rate.14 On the other hand, a
nonmonotonic relationship implies that the rate of increase (decrease) in the variables may change with a change in
one variable. This produces a ‘curved pattern’ within the data, requiring a non-linear modelling. Thus, while a mono-
tonic relationship suggests the relation between the variables considered is positive or negative at all levels of the
variables, this is not so for a nonmonotonic relationship.
The argument above suggests that, whether or not the relationship between decentralization and government
size via democracy is positive or negative, it may not stay positive or negative over time if it is non-linear. There are
likely to be some points in time where it will be positive and others where it will be negative. For instance, the
14A monotonic inverse relationship is equivalent to a negative correlation, while monotonic direct relationship is equivalent to a positive correlation. Note
that while all linear relationships are monotonic, not all monotonic relationships are linear (cf. Yitzhaki & Schechtman, 2012).
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relationship at the beginning of a democracy may not be the same as that for an advanced democracy. As govern-
ment size varies with the level of democracy, so is the expected effect of decentralization via democracy on govern-
ment size. The relationship is likely to be U shaped; start high, hit a trough and rise again. That is, at initial levels of
democracy, decentralization may be associated with reduced government size; democracy is expected to lead to effi-
cient spending, which implies initially lower levels of spending compared to say autocracy. It may then reach a mini-
mum over time. However, given that increased democracy comes with it an increase in heterogenous preferences
among the citizens and an improved ability of citizens to demand higher government spending, the welfare state is
TABLE 6 Robustness check: instrumental variable estimations
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD 0.338*** 0.323*** 0.307*** 0.325*** 0.360***
(0.123) (0.099) (0.104) (0.100) (0.115)
DEM 0.491** 0.516** 0.564** 0.507** 0.737***
(0.214) (0.209) (0.270) (0.213) (0.269)
FD ∗DEM 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.017*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
GDPpc 0.061 0.056 0.050 0.065 0.077*
(0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
KOFGI 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.028
(0.095) (0.090) (0.091) (0.089) (0.095)
Young 0.107 0.136 0.133 0.101 0.157
(0.153) (0.154) (0.154) (0.152) (0.154)
Old 0.348*** 0.370*** 0.358*** 0.345*** 0.387***
(0.108) (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.110)
CBI 0.570*** 0.557*** 0.540*** 0.573*** 0.547***
(0.113) (0.111) (0.109) (0.114) (0.112)
EMU 0.408*** 0.404*** 0.393*** 0.406*** 0.408***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056)
Fiscalrule 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.156*** 0.148*** 0.126***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
R2 0.306 0.306 0.307 0.306 0.306
F statistic 8.13 8.05 7.97 7.97 8.09
Anderson(under) 91.746 112.655 108.493 118.391 94.23
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C-D(weak) 96.179 121.101 116.04 128.161 99.075
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 935 935 935 935 935
Note: The dependent variable is government spending. The instrument used is the weighted average of fiscal
decentralization from the neighbouring countries (weighted by the contiguity matrix; see Qiao et al., 2019). All regressions
include a constant term.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
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required to meet such preferences with increased spending. Hence, advanced democracies are often associated with
bigger government size and high fiscal decentralization.
The estimation results for the nonmonotonic relationship in Table 7 shows similar effects of fiscal decentraliza-
tion, democracy and the interaction term on government size: negative and statistically significant for fiscal decen-
tralization and democracy on government size (except for the egalitarian democracy index) and a positive effect of
the interaction term on government size (except for the egalitarian democracy index). However, the coefficients of
TABLE 7 Nonmonotonic relationship
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD 0.125** 0.111** 0.115** 0.111** 0.107**
(0.052) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) (0.051)
DEM 0.407** 0.397* 0.619** 0.354* 0.356
(0.198) (0.226) (0.285) (0.207) (0.251)
FD ∗DEM 0.017* 0.018* 0.021* 0.017* 0.018
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
FD2 0.0002 0.00005 0.00007 0.00003 0.00002
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
FD2 ∗DEM 0.00001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0007
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
GDPpc 0.101 0.104 0.120 0.092 0.093
(0.077) (0.071) (0.077) (0.074) (0.075)
KOFGI 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Urban 0.021 0.006 0.050 0.014 0.032
(0.125) (0.122) (0.122) (0.120) (0.117)
Young 0.473*** 0.466*** 0.439*** 0.483*** 0.462***
(0.117) (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115)
Old 0.464*** 0.440*** 0.497*** 0.437*** 0.427***
(0.144) (0.147) (0.156) (0.142) (0.139)
CBI 0.046 0.050 0.047 0.045 0.044
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
EMU 0.006 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.003
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037)
Fiscalrule 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 3.604*** 3.533*** 4.088*** 3.227*** 3.248***
(1.114) (1.076) (1.237) (1.019) (1.052)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1176 1176 1176 1176 1176
Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Note: Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
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the squared term of fiscal decentralization (FD2) and the interaction of the squared of FD and democracy (FD2 ∗DEM)
are statistically insignificant.
We provide a plot of the nonmonotonic relationship in Figure 2.15 Figure 2 seems to show non-linear relation-
ship between decentralization, democracy and government size under varieties of democracy. The plot of spending
15To examine nonmonotonicity, I make use of the ‘lowess’ command in STATA. As noted earlier, if the graphs show a nonmonotonic effect, then I need to
include fiscal decentralization squared and the interaction term of fiscal decentralization squared and democracy in Equation (1). I explicitly specify a
bandwidth of 0.3, meaning 30% of the data is used in smoothing each point. I use smaller bandwidth in order to follow the original data more closely.
Lowess is desired due to its locality, as it tends to follow the data. Hence, it gives locally weighted scatterplot smoothing. Polynomial smoothing methods
are global; that is, what happens on the extreme left of a scatterplot can affect the fitted value in the extreme right.
F IGURE 2 Nonmonotonic plot of varieties of spending under varieties of democracy [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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suggests a non-linear relationship, generally of the inverted-U-shape type. This is however by no means conclusive
as the coefficients of the relevant variables—decentralization squared and the interaction term of the square of
decentralization and democracy—in Table 6 are statistically insignificant. Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence
of a nonmonotonic relationship in this case; the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship between decen-
tralization and government size is likely to be more linear. Any non-linearity would not be captured by a squared
term, as found. It may be the case that the non-linearity is addressed when conditioning on controls, suggesting het-
erogeneity, which including say an OECD interaction may not fully capture.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the mediating effect of democracy in explaining the relationship between
decentralization and government size. From a development perspective, the relation between fiscal
decentralization, democracy and government size may be important to explaining subnational development. We
consider the period 1970–2013. We proxy decentralization by fiscal decentralization, use total spending as our pri-
mary measure of government size and adopt the V-Dem high-level democracy indices as measures of democracy.
Our study is to our knowledge unique as it considers the mediating effect of varieties of democracy as against the
use of an institutional proxy for democracy or a binary variable as measure of democracy. Our indices provide an
interval of between 0 and 1 which measures high and low democracy for specific concepts of democracy such as
electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian democracies. The current paper also accounts for the
influence of regime change and examines the effect of non-linearity. Our robustness tests are (i) using subsample
of developed and developing countries, (ii) an estimation with employment as an alternative measure of
government size, (iii) an estimation with regime change as an alternative measure of democracy and (iv) an
instrumental variable estimation to take care of endogeneity.
Our main finding is that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government spending differs under
different types of democracy. In most cases, however, the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on government
size seems largest for participatory democracy. Further, we find that an increase in participatory democracy more
strongly affects government size than increases in other types of democracy. Therefore, the most important features
of democracy relevant to the democracy–government size relationship are those that are captured within the Partici-
patory democracy index. Significantly, we find evidence of the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship
between decentralization and government size. Specifically, the interaction term shows that the negative effect of
fiscal decentralization diminishes as the democracy index gets higher, particularly for the participatory democracy
index irrespective of whether government size is measured by spending-to-GDP or employment. The findings for
the interaction term is consistent in all cases except for developing countries where we find a negative interaction
term and no statistically significant effect of the interaction term for all other concepts of democracy. The negative
interaction term for the liberal democracy index in developing countries suggests the negative effect of fiscal decen-
tralization increases as the levels of such democracy index gets higher. We do not find a non-linear relationship
between decentralization and government size.
Our results provide important implications for policy. Fiscal decentralization may be an effective tool for citizens
to bargain for increased public goods provision in a democracy in general, more so where the core characteristic of
the democracy is participatory. For a developed country, all concepts of democracy could be important as govern-
ment size is likely to increase in all cases. Given the struggles of developing countries to control large government
sizes, the beast could be starved if decentralization comes with it a more liberal democracy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Edward Anderson, Christa Brunnschweiler, Oliver Morrissey, Peter Moffatt and an anonymous referee for
valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
KWABENA OBENG 21
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data set is freely available for other researchers to use and is available on request from the author.
ORCID
Samuel Kwabena Obeng https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9192-5532
REFERENCES
Alesina, A., & Bayoumi, T. (1996). The costs and benefits of fiscal rules: Evidence from US states. (No. w5614): National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Alesina, A., & Wacziarg, R. (1998). Openness, country size and government. Journal of Public Economics, 69(3), 305–321.
Armingeon, K., Romana, C., Panajotis, P., Marlène, G., & Philipp, L. (2008). Comparative political data set III 1990–2006.
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.
Bardhan, P., Mitra, S., Mookherjee, D., & Sarkar, A. (2008). Political participation, clientelism and targeting of local govern-
ment programs: Analysis of survey results from rural West Bengal, India, Department of Economics, Boston University,
Boston.
Baskaran, T. (2011). Fiscal decentralization, ideology, and the size of the public sector. European Journal of Political Economy,
27(3), 485–506.
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political economy: The database of
political institutions. World Bank Economic Review, 15, 165–176.
Beyani, C. (2000). Human Rights Standards and the Free Movement of People Within States: Oxford University Press.
Bjørnskov, C., & Rode, M. (2020). Regime types and regime change: A new dataset on democracy, coups, and political insti-
tutions. The Review of International Organizations, 15, 531–551.
Boix, C. (2001). Democracy, development, and the public sector. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 1–17.
Bossert, T. J., Larraömaga, O., Giedion, U., Arbelaez, J. J., & Bowser, D. M. (2003). Decentralization and equity of resource
allocation: Evidence from Colombia and Chile. Bulletin of the World Health organization, 81, 95–100.
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1977). Towards a tax constitution for leviathan. Journal of Public Economics, 8(3), 255–273.
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1979). The logic of tax limits: Alternative constitutional constraints on the power to tax.
National Tax Journal, 32(2), 11–22.
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The Power of Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution: Cambridge University
Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1976). Taxation in fiscal exchange. Journal of Public Economics, 6(1–2), 17–29.
Buchanan, J. M., & Wagner, R. E. (1977). Democracy in deficit: The political legacy of Lord Keynes.
Cassette, A., & Paty, S. (2010). Fiscal decentralization and the size of government: A European country empirical analysis.
Public Choice, 143(1–2), 173–189.
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143, 67–101.
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., …, & Ziblatt, D. (2020). V-Dem [Country–
Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S. E., & Teorell, J. (2017). V-Dem comparisons and contrasts with other
measurement projects. (V-Dem Working Paper 45).
Davoodi, H., & Zou, H. F. (1998). Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: A cross-country study. Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics, 43(2), 244–257.
Driscoll, J. C., & Kraay, A. C. (1998). Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially dependent panel data. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 80(4), 549–560.
Ehdaie, J. (1994). Fiscal decentralization and the size of government: An extension with evidence from cross-country data.
(Working Paper Series, No. 1387): World Bank Policy Research.
Feld, L. P., Kirchgässner, G., & Schaltegger, C. A. (2010). Decentralized taxation and the size of government: Evidence from
Swiss state and local governments. Southern Economic Journal, 77(1), 27–48.
Fischer, S. (1995). Central-bank independence revisited. The American Economic Review, 85(2), 201–206.
Fiva, J. (2006). New evidence on the effects of fiscal decentralization on the size and composition of government spending.
FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis, 62(2), 250–280.
Forbes, K. F., & Zampelli, E. M. (1989). Is Leviathan a mythical beast? American Economic Review, 79(3), 568–577.
Garman, C., Haggard, S., & Willis, E. (2001). Fiscal decentralization: A political theory with Latin American cases.
World Politics, 53(2), 205–236.
Garrett, G. (1998). Shrinking states? Globalization and national autonomy in the OECD. Oxford Development Studies, 26(1),
71–97.
Garriga, A. C. (2016). Central bank independence in the world: A new data set. International Interactions, 42(5), 849–868.
22 KWABENA OBENG
Golem, S. (2010). Fiscal decentralization and the size of government: A review of the empirical literature. Financial Theory
and Practice, 34(1), 53–69.
Grossman, P. J. (1989). Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension. Public Choice, 62(1), 63–69.
Grossman, P. J., & West, E. G. (1994). Federalism and the growth of government revisited. Public Choice, 79, 19–32.
Gygli, S., Haelg, F., Potrafke, N., & Sturm, J. E. (2019). The KOF globalization index-revisited. Review of International Organi-
zations, 14(3), 543–574.
Hicks, A. M., & Swank, D. H. (1992). Politics, institutions, and welfare spending in industrialized democracies, 1960–82.
American Political Science Review, 86(3), 658–674.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G. N., & Schakel, A. H. (2010). The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies:
Routledge.
Isham, J., Kaufmann, D., & Pritchett, L. H. (1997). Civil liberties, democracy, and the performance of government projects.
The World Bank Economic Review, 11(2), 219–242.
Jia, J., Guo, Q., & Zhang, J. (2014). Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China. China Economic Review, 28,
107–122.
Jin, H., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (2005). Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style. Journal
of Public Economics, 89(9–10), 1719–1742.
Jin, J., & Zou, H. (2002). How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national and subnational government size? Jour-
nal of Urban Economics, 52(2), 270–293.
Joulfaian, D., & Marlow, M. L. (1990). Government size and decentralization: Evidence from disaggregated data. Southern
Economic Journal, 56(4), 1094–1102.
Joulfaian, D., & Marlow, M. L. (1991). Centralisation and government competition. Applied Economics, 23(10), 1603–1612.
Karlström, K. (2015). Decentralization, corruption, and the role of democracy. (QoG Working Paper Series 2015:14).
Keyssar, A. (2000). The Right to Vote. The Contested History of Democracy in the United States. New York: Basic Books.
Kotera, G., Okada, K., & Samreth, S. (2012). Government size, democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation. Eco-
nomic Modelling, 29(6), 2340–2348.
Liberati, O., & Sacchi, A. (2013). Tax decentralization and local government size. Public Choice, 157(1–2), 183–205.
Lledo, V., Yoon, S., Fang, X., Mbaye, S., & Kim, Y. (2017). Fiscal rules at a glance. IMF Background paper. Dataset is available
at http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm
Marlow, E. M. (1988). Fiscal decentralization and government size. Public Choice, 56(3), 259–269.
Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Yao, M. (2009). Fiscal decentralization and public sector employment: A cross-country analysis. Pub-
lic Finance Review, 37(5), 539–571.
Nelson, M. A. (1986). An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the Leviathan model of govern-
ment. Public Choice, 49(3), 283–294.
Neyapti, B. (2013). Fiscal decentralization, fiscal rules and fiscal discipline. Economics Letters, 121(3), 528–532.
Niskanen, W. A. (2006). Limiting government: The failure of starve the beast. Cato Journal, 26(3), 553.
Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oates, W. (1985). Searching for Leviathan: An empirical study. American Economic Review, 75, 748–758.
Paxton, P. (2000). Women’s suffrage in the measurement of democracy: Problems of operationalization. Studies in Compara-
tive International Development, 35(3), 92–111.
Pemstein, D., Marquardt, K. L., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y., Medzihorsky, J., Krusell, J., Miri, F., & von Romer, J. (2020). The V-Dem
measurement model: Latent variable analysis for cross-national and cross-temporal expert-coded data, (5th ed.). (V-Dem
Working Paper No 21). Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Prohl, S., & Schneider, F. (2009). Does decentralization reduce government size? A quantitative study of the decentralization
hypothesis. Public Finance Review, 37(6), 639–664.
Qiao, M., Ding, S., & Liu, Y. (2019). Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy. European Journal of
Political Economy, 59, 316–330.
Qiao, B., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Xu, Y. (2008). The tradeoff between growth and equity in decentralization policy: China's
experience. Journal of Development Economics, 86(1), 112–128.
Rodden, J. (2003). Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal federalism and the growth of government. International Organisation, 57(4),
695–729.
Rodden, J. (2004). Comparative federalism and decentralization: On meaning and measurement. Comparative Politics, 36(40),
481–500.
Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments? Journal of Political Economy, 106(5), 997–1003.
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2007). Do tax cuts starve the beast: The effect of tax changes on government spending.
National Bureau of Economic Research, (No. w13548).
Shadbegian, R. J. (1999). Fiscal federalism, collusion, and government size: Evidence from the states. Public Finance Review,
27(3), 262–281.
KWABENA OBENG 23
Staiger, D. O., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica, 65(3), 557–586.
Stegarescu, D. (2005). Public sector decentralization: Measurement concepts and recent international trends. Fiscal Studies,
26(3), 301–333.
Stein, E. (1999). Fiscal decentralization and government size in Latin America. Journal of Applied Economics, 2(2), 357–391.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditure. Journal of Political Economics, 64(5), 416–424.
Wagner, A. (1893). Grundlegung der politschen Oekonomie. (3rd ed.).: C.F. Winter.
Weingast, B. R. (2009). Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives. Journal of Urban Economics,
65(3), 279–293.
World Bank. (2018). World development indicators. World Bank.
Wu, A. M., & Lin, M. (2012). Determinants of government size: Evidence from China. Public Choice, 151(1–2), 255–270.
Yitzhaki, S., & Schechtman, E. (2012). Identifying monotonic and non-monotonic relationships. Economics Letters, 116(1),
23–25.
Zhang, T., & Zou, H. F. (1998). Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 67(2), 221–240.
How to cite this article: Kwabena Obeng, S. (2021). Fiscal decentralization, democracy and government size:
Disentangling the complexities. Journal of International Development, 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3545
24 KWABENA OBENG
APPENDIX A
F IGURE A1 V-Dem plot by country for developed and developing countries, 2013 [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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TABLE A1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Spending 3419 25.72921 12.57706 1.877688 210.2051
Employ 1132 1845.236 4226.855 1.4 38063
FD 1615 25.30753 17.90808 0.018681 98.75611
GDPpc 7893 8.2243 1.509572 4.751814 11.87928
KOFGI 7696 48.93902 16.55902 14.2923 90.39829
Urban 10,166 51.21273 25.17438 2.845001 100
Young 9242 34.4939 10.32543 11.13134 51.88591
Old 9242 6.302605 4.23739 0.75047 24.62983
CBI 5832 0.491597 0.202769 0.016667 0.979
EMU 10,296 0.019911 0.1397 0 1
Fiscal rule 10,296 0.129274 0.335519 0 1
Electoral 7358 0.425893 0.289686 0.009 0.924
Liberal 7295 0.329997 0.276637 0.003 0.891
Participatory 7326 0.263908 0.215059 0.005 0.808
Deliberative 7358 0.332631 0.272712 0.003 0.899
Egalitarian 7358 0.336598 0.246317 0.015 0.887
Regime change lag 3344 0.010467 0.101784 0 1
TABLE A2 Pairwise correlation for varieties of democracy
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
Electoral 1.0000
Liberal 0.9748 1.0000
Participatory 0.9682 0.9683 1.0000
Deliberative 0.9713 0.9798 0.9640 1.0000
Egalitarian 0.9481 0.9733 0.9466 0.9595 1.0000
26 KWABENA OBENG
TABLE A3 List of countries
Albania Czech Republic Jamaica Peru
Argentina Germany Jordan Poland
Armenia Denmark Japan Portugal
Australia Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Paraguay
Austria Spain Korea, Rep. Russian Federation
Azerbaijan Estonia Lesotho El Salvador
Belgium Finland Lithuania Serbia
Bulgaria France Luxembourg Slovak Republic
Bosnia and Herzegovina United Kingdom Latvia Slovenia
Belarus Georgia Morocco Sweden
Bolivia Greece Moldova Thailand
Brazil Honduras Mexico Tunisia
Canada Croatia Macedonia, FYR Turkey
Switzerland Hungary Malta Ukraine
Chile India Mongolia United States
Congo Rep. Ireland Mauritius South Africa
Colombia Iran, Islamic Rep. Malaysia
Cabo Verde Iceland Netherlands
Costa Rica Israel Norway
Cyprus Italy New Zealand
Note: Developed countries are defined by OECD countries at the start of the 1990s given in bold font.
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TABLE A4 Developing countries
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD 0.021 0.042 0.005 0.023 0.034
(0.040) (0.043) (0.038) (0.037) (0.048)
DEM 0.017 0.064 0.665* 0.139 0.076
(0.185) (0.222) (0.345) (0.246) (0.291)
FD ∗DEM 0.004 0.011* 0.004 0.006 0.007
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
GDPpc 0.222** 0.249*** 0.247*** 0.214** 0.222**
(0.088) (0.086) (0.083) (0.086) (0.086)
KOFGI 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.0030 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban 0.583*** 0.627*** 0.526*** 0.592*** 0.611***
(0.145) (0.140) (0.143) (0.141) (0.160)
Young 0.408 0.367 0.242 0.452 0.427
(0.319) (0.340) (0.278) (0.325) (0.317)
Old 0.865*** 0.852*** 1.025*** 0.797*** 0.842***
(0.273) (0.245) (0.272) (0.245) (0.247)
CBI 0.127 0.126 0.132 0.124 0.124
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
EMU 0.636*** 0.638*** 0.664*** 0.626*** 0.634***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.062) (0.057) (0.057)
Fiscalrule 0.049** 0.060** 0.046* 0.048** 0.051***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 479 479 479 479 479
Countries 40 40 40 40 40
Note: Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
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TABLE A5 Developed countries
Variables Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD 0.312*** 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.303*** 0.287***
(0.063) (0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.063)
DEM 0.451*** 0.445*** 0.686*** 0.453*** 0.461***
(0.129) (0.146) (0.211) (0.148) (0.167)
FD ∗DEM 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.0114*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
GDPpc 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.410*** 0.369*** 0.400***
(0.055) (0.057) (0.062) (0.057) (0.059)
KOFGI 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.0241*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Urban 0.026 0.044 0.106 0.0617 0.024
(0.130) (0.134) (0.133) (0.138) (0.133)
Young 0.301** 0.326** 0.284** 0.330** 0.326**
(0.138) (0.142) (0.131) (0.134) (0.140)
Old 0.381*** 0.354** 0.358** 0.327** 0.335**
(0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.132) (0.132)
CBI 0.105*** 0.099*** 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.103***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
EMU 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.119***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Fiscalrule 0.014 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 697 697 697 697 697
Countries 27 27 27 27 27
Note: Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
KWABENA OBENG 29
TABLE A6 Properties of the V-Dem measure
Properties of democracy
Electoral Participatory
Core values: Contestation, competition. Core values: Direct, active participation in
Question: Are important government offices decision making by the people.
filled by free and fair multiparty elections Question: Do citizens participate in political
before a broad electorate? decision making?
Institutions: Elections, political parties, Institutions: Voting, civil society, strong local
competitiveness, suffrage and turnover. government and direct democracy instruments.
Liberal Deliberative
Core values: Individual liberty, protection Core values: Reasoned debate and rational
against tyranny of majority and state arguments.
repression. Question: Are political decisions the product
Question: Is power constrained and are of public deliberation based on reasoned
individual rights guaranteed? and rational justification?
Institutions: Civil liberties, independent Institutions: Media, hearings, panels, other
bodies (media, interest groups); separation deliberative and consultative bodies.
of powers, constitutional constraints on the
executive and strong judiciary with political role.
Egalitarian
Core values: Equal political empowerment.
Question: Are all citizens equally empowered
to use their political rights?
Institutions: Formal and informal practices
that safeguard or promote equal
distribution of resources and equal treatment.
Source: Coppedge et al. (2017).
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